This resulted in some source reformatting becoming a bit less trippy
This is the script I used to run clang-format appropriately enough:
#! /bin/bash
include_re=$(yq -r '.repos.[].hooks.[] | select(.id == "clang-format") | .files' < .pre-commit-config.yaml)
known_generated=( crypto/bn/bn_prime.h
crypto/objects/obj_dat.h
crypto/objects/obj_xref.h
include/openssl/obj_mac.h
crypto/conf/conf_def.h
crypto/asn1/charmap.h
'*_err.c'
'*err.h' )
exclusions=()
for g in "${known_generated[@]}"; do
# Convert pattern to a regex
g=${g//\./\\.}
g=${g//\*/.\*}
exclusions+=( "^${g}\$" )
done
# Join all exclusions into one regex
exclude_re=$(IFS='|'; echo "${exclusions[*]}")
(set -x; git ls-files | grep -E $include_re | grep -Ev $exclude_re | xargs clang-format -i)
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <paulyang.inf@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/29383)
Custom cipher methods are considered legacy and have been deprecated
since 3.0. With the removal of ENGINEs they become a lot less useful
and add significant complexity to the code. We should therefore remove
them in 4.0.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/29299)
Implement EVP_SIGNATURE_hash_message_update() to check for support
of EVP_PKEY_sign_message_update() and EVP_PKEY_verify_message_update() and
use this function to replace the has_msg_update column in CMS.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28923)
Enable signature verification for hashless signing schemes, such as ML-DSA
and EdDSA, for the non-attribute case of CMS. Also in this case the BIO
with the plain input data needs to be passed through to the signature
verification function so that the pure-mode signature verification method
can hash the plain data itself.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28923)
Enable the ability to sign with a hashless signing schemes, such as ML-DSA
in pure mode, in case no attributes are used in CMS. To support this, pass
the BIO with the plain data through to the signing function so that key's
pure mode signing scheme can hash the data itself.
The current implementation relies on a seek'able BIO so that the data
stream can be read multiple times for support of multiple keys.
Some signing schemes, such as ML-DSA, support the message_update function
when signing data, others, such as EdDSA keys do not support it. The former
allows for reading data in smaller chunks and calling
EVP_PKEY_sign_message_update with the data, while the latter requires that
all data are all read into memory and then passed for signing. This latter
method could run into out-of-memory issue when signing very large files.
Fixes: #28279
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28923)
Get a default hash for hash-less signing schemes such as ML-DSA, SLH-DSA,
and EdDSA in the case when signed attributes are present as well as for the
no signed attributes case. For the latter case, EdDSA is the only signing
scheme that has a required hash (sha512 for ED25519 and shake256 for
ED448), all other ones have a suggested hash. Only use the suggested hash
if the hash provided by the caller of CMS_add1_signer passed a NULL pointer
for md. Use the required hash in any case, overriding any choice of the
caller.
Fixes: #13523
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28923)
Encrypted Data does not support AEAD algorithms. If you wish to
use AEAD algorithms you will have to use a CMS_AuthEnvelopedData
structure. Therefore, when AEAD algorithms are used with
CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key will now return an error.
Fixes: #28607
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28711)
Fixes CVE-2025-9230
The check is off by 8 bytes so it is possible to overread by
up to 8 bytes and overwrite up to 4 bytes.
Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Also add support for ML-KEM in CMS (draft-ietf-lamps-cms-kyber).
Add the -recip_kdf and -recip_ukm parameters to `openssl cms -encrypt`
to allow the user to specify the KDF algorithm and optional user
keying material for each recipient.
A provider may indicate which RecipientInfo type is supported
for a key, otherwise CMS will try to figure it out itself. A
provider may also indicate which KDF to use in KEMRecipientInfo
if the user hasn't specified one.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/27681)
This is useful for AEAD ciphers where it is not possible to use AEAD
cipher (currently only AES GCM supported) for password recipient info
because the same cipher is used for encrypting the password and it is
not possible to store tag for this purpose so different cipher (e.g.
AES CBC) needs to be selected.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26871)
CLA: trivial
When entering the branch (pbe_nid <= 0), line 66 assigns new values to the variable of line 67 (pbe_nid = NID_id_pbkdf2).
However, it is not used anywhere in the future.
For this reason, lines 66 and 67 were removed.
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/27296)
Signature schemes like Ed25519 or ML-DSA use "pure" signing,
i.e. they directly sign the tbs data instead of signing a digest.
This is already supported in the X509 code, but not in CMS.
This commit adds support for such schemes to CMS.
This is a minimalistic set of changes, based in the work done
by David von Oheimb.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Saša Nedvědický <sashan@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26867)
Previously there was no way to create a CMS SignedData signature without a
signing time attribute, because CMS_SignerInfo_sign added it unconditionally.
However, there is a use case (PAdES signatures) where this attribute is not
allowed, so this commit introduces a new flag to the CMS API that causes this
attribute to be omitted at signing time.
Also add -no_signing_time option to cms command.
Fixes#15777
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15783)
That caused several memory leaks in case of error.
Also when the CMS object that is created by CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt
is not used in the normal way, but instead just deleted
by CMS_ContentInfo_free some memory was lost.
Fixes#21985
Reviewed-by: Todd Short <todd.short@me.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22031)
The EVP_CIPHER api currently assumes that calls made into several APIs
have already initalized the cipher in a given context via a call to
EVP_CipherInit[_ex[2]]. If that hasnt been done, instead of an error,
the result is typically a SIGSEGV.
Correct that by adding missing NULL checks in the apropriate apis prior
to using ctx->cipher
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22995)
